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The Normative Medium of Human Action*
Abstract
In this paper the notion of individual agency is critically examined in light of the enactive 
approach to understanding the mind. It is argued that following the work of Hanne De 
Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Tom Froese and others, agency must be considered in terms 
that are situational rather than bounded by biological individuals. Such a revised notion 
of agency presents substantive challenges to our current theory and research practices in 
this area. Drawing on the work of Harry Heft, Roger Barker and others some theoretical 
and methodological resources are advanced that may help to address these challenges. It 
is argued that the notion of ‘behaviour settings’ developed by Barker and his colleagues, 
and refined somewhat more recently by Heft, offers a coherent way of thinking in terms that 



















cal	 and	 cognitive	 scientific	 literature.	 For	



























tors.	Psychology,	particularly	 in	 its	 interdisciplinary	guise	of	cognitive	sci-












tion,	 specifically	 those	of	 embeddedness,	or	 situatedness,	 and	 the	dynamic	
nature	of	individuality	and	normativity.	This	new	tradition	–	here	illustrated	













In	 the	 next	 section	 a	more	 distributed	 notion	 of	 agency	 is	 outlined.	A	 de-
tailed	definition	of	agency	as	put	forward	by	Barandiaran,	Di	Paolo,	&	Rohde	
(2009)	 is	 first	 described,	with	 a	 particular	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 the	way	 in	
which	agency	is	situated,	a	phenomenon	emergent	between	an	agent	and	its	
environment.	In	addition,	using	De	Jaegher	and	Froese’s	(2009)	analysis	of	
social	 interaction	 as	 a	 particular	 aspect	 of	 the	 environment,	 agency	within	









issue	 in	 a	 systematic	manner.	Drawing	heavily	on	 the	work	of	Harry	Heft	
(2001,	2011)	the	historical	work	of	Edwin	Holt	and	his	concept	of	the	situ-
ation	is	used,	along	with	the	methodological	ideas	of	Roger	Barker	and	Phil	









1. Putting agency in context
1.1. Defining ‘agency’
In	a	detailed	and	challenging	paper	examining	 the	necessary	and	sufficient	
conditions	 for	 agency	Barandiaran,	Di	Paolo,	 and	Rohde	 (2009)	 identified	
three	key	characteristics:	individuality,	interactional	asymmetry,	and	norma-
tivity.










other	 component	 process.	 This	 circularity	 provides	 organisational	 closure,	




The	 second	characteristic	of	 agency	 identified	by	Barandiaran	et	 al.,	 inter-
actional	asymmetry,	essentially	concerns	 responsibility.	Things	which	“just	








coupling	 between	 the	 agent	 and	 its	 environment	 and	 how	 the	 system	 as	 a	
whole	is	capable	of	affecting	the	parameters	of	that	coupling	and	thus	capable	
of	modulating	the	interaction	between	itself	and	the	world	around	it.	Agents	





























those	goals	 to	be	encompassed	by	 the	skin	of	 the	agent.	 In	fact,	given	that	
a	cognitive	agent’s	behaviour	is	continually	attuned	to	its	environment,	be-
ing	structured	by	the	details	of	 the	world	 in	which	it	 is	acting,	normativity	























it	 can	 also	 exist	 in	 the	 interaction	dynamics	between	 social	 agents.	Where	
such	systems	come	into	existence	within	social	interactions,	the	agency	of	the	
individuals	involved	becomes	transformed.	What	was	a	set	of	two	(or	more)	
distinct	 agents	 involved	 in	 separate	 coordinations	with	 their	 environments	
is	 encompassed	by	a	 larger	 shared	activity,	what	De	Jaegher	and	Di	Paolo	
(2007)	 term	 ‘participatory	 sense-making’.	 Participatory	 sense-making	 is	 a	
phenomenon	of	shared	activity	in	which	all	of	the	agents	in	question	become	
enmeshed.	It	is	crucial	for	the	recognition	of	participatory	sense-making	that	














































1.3. Situated normativity and the agency of practice













































ourselves	sensitive	 to	norms	 that	are	proper	 to	 that	domain,	 in	many	cases	


















but	 their	sensitivity	 to	 the	specific	details	of	 the	present	situation,	 i.e.	 their	
capacity	to	respond	to	and	coordinate	with	the	constraints	and	possibilities	in	
the	particular	situation,	the	particular	materials,	with	which	they	are	engaged.	































2. A psychology of situations


















as	 recently	 reinvigorated	 by	 Harry	 Heft	 (2001,	 2011)	 using	 the	 tools	 of	
Roger	Barker	and	Phil	Schoggen’s	behaviour	settings	theory	(Barker,	1968;	
Schoggen,	1989).
2.1. Holt’s description of situations
The	work	 of	Edwin	Holt	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century	 presaged	many	 of	


















Heft	 argues	 that	 situations	 are	 a	 valuable	 concept,	 a	 means	 of	 theorising	







ioural	 science	of	Roger	Barker	 (1968)	and	Phil	Schoggen	(1989)	and	 their	
colleagues,	is	a	prime	candidate	for	disciplining	Holt’s	idea	of	the	situation.
2.2. Barker’s ecological psychology
On	a	train	journey	across	Kansas	in	the	mid-1940s	Roger	Barker	experienced	







any	authority	about	how	people	actually	behaved	 in	 their	day-to-day	 lives.	










in	 a	 small	 town,	 known	 primarily	 in	 their	 publications	 by	 the	 pseudonym	
‘Midwest’.	The	purpose	of	the	research	station	was	to	study	human	behav-




suggested	 it	would.	The	expectation	was	 that	most	behaviour	 exhibited	by	
people	would	be	in	response	to	a	behaviour	by	someone	else	–	a	social	stimu-
lus	would	provoke	a	given	behaviour	as	response.	While	this	proved	to	be	a	











































































2.3. Synomorphs, affordances, and normativity
Barker	(1968)	describes	behaviour	settings	as	consisting	of	sets	of	“behav-
iour-milieu	 synomorphs”,	 or	 just	 ‘synomorphs’.	A	 synomorph	 consists	 of	
both	behaviour	and	its	requisite	physical	attributes,	a	whole	of	“behaviour-
and-circumjacent-synomorphic-mileu	 entities”	 (Barker,	 1968,	 pp.	 19–20).	
This	concept	is	specifically	intended	to	allow	descriptions	of	a	behaviour	set-
















ever,	 that	a	description	of	behaviour	settings	 in	 terms	of	affordances	rather	
than	the	more	general	behaviour	settings	vocabulary,	forces	the	observer	to	
consider	not	just	the	standing	pattern	of	behaviour	but	also	the	membership	




of	 social,	 legal	 and	other	 limitations	 control	 presence	 in	different	 environ-
ments),	but	 in	considering	 the	various	ways	 in	which	a	behaviour	setting’s	
affordances	not	just	enable	but	also	constrain	the	possibilities	of	actions	and	




































































Processes	 of	 enculturation	 open	 sets	 of	 possible	 actions	 for	 an	 individual	
(sets	of	potential	action	that	are	also	expressions	of	the	values	of	the	culture	
in	 question).	Resources,	 such	 as	 behaviour	 settings,	 are	made	 available	 to	














































































diaran,	Di	Paolo,	and	Rohde	 (2009)	describe	 still	 act	 as	principles,	 though	
perhaps	revised	or	altered	ones,	for	making	such	decisions.
3.2. A speculation: collaborative action, institutional agents, 
    and interactional asymmetry
If	we	accept	that	embedding	in	a	social	network	transforms	individual	agency,	
or	 in	 the	case	of	people	enables	 the	development	of	a	 recognisably	human	










beyond	 the	scope	of	 the	present	paper.	However,	we	can	note	 that	 there	 is	























effectively	 metabolising	 the	 behaviour	 of	 groups	 of	 people	 to	 continue	 its	
own	existence.	Whether	such	a	description	of	an	institution	or	other	cultural	
practice	is	metaphorical	or	literal	will	depend	on	there	being	a	coherent	ac-
count	of	 the	 institution’s	dynamic	 individuality.	No	claim	 is	made	here	 re-


























Conclusion: Immersed in value
An	enactive	 take	on	human	agency	 runs	counter	 to	a	prototypical	Western	
view.	Rather	than	actions	moving	outward	into	behaviour	from	represented	
ideals	or	intentions,	they	flow	like	currents	through	complex	fields	of	norma-
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Situirana djelovnost: normativni medij ljudskog djelovanja
Sažetak
U ovome se radu kritički ispituje pojam individualne djelovnosti u svjetlu odjelovljujućeg pri-
stupa razumijevanju uma. Tvrdi se da, prateći rad Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiela Di Paola, 
Toma Froesea i dr., djelovnost mora biti shvaćena u terminima koji su situacijski, a ne ogra-
ničeni biološkim individuama. Takav revidiran pojam djelovnosti predstavlja značajne izazove 
našoj trenutnoj teoriji i istraživačkoj praksi u tom području. Oslanjajući se na radove Harryja 
Hefta, Rogera Barkera i dr., predložit će se neki teorijski i metodološki resursi koji bi mogli 
pomoći u suočavanju s ovim izazovima. U radu se tvrdi da pojam ‘okružje ponašanja’, koji su 
razvili Barker i njegovi suradnici a nedavno doradio Heft, nudi koherentan način mišljenja koji 




Situierte Handlungsfähigkeit: normatives Medium des menschlichen Handelns
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Paper wird der Begriff der individuellen Handlungsfähigkeit kritisch untersucht – im 
Lichte des enaktiven Ansatzes zur Auffassung des Verstands. Indem man die Arbeit Hanne De 
Jaeghers, Ezequiel Di Paolos, Tom Froeses u. a. verfolgt, wird dargelegt, dass die Handlungs-
fähigkeit eher unter dem Situationsaspekt betrachtet werden muss als unter dem Aspekt der 
Begrenzung durch biologische Individuen. Solch eine revidierte Notion der Handlungsfähigkeit 
stellt bedeutungsvolle Herausforderungen für unsere aktuelle Theorie und Forschungspraktiken 
in diesem Bereich dar. Gestützt auf die Arbeit von Harry Heft, Roger Barker u. a. werden ei-
nige theoretische und methodologische Ressourcen vorgebracht, die zum Herangehen an diese 
Herausforderungen beitragen könnten. Man vertritt die Ansicht, dass der Begriff der „Verhal-
tenseinstellungen“, den Barker samt seinen Kollegen entwickelt und Heft in jüngerer Zeit nen-
nenswert verfeinert hat, eine kohärente Denkweise bietet, die der systemischen und holistischen 




Capacité d’agir située : Le moyen normatif de l’action humaine
Résumé
Dans cet article, la notion de capacité d’agir individuelle fait l’objet d’un examen critique à 
la lumière de l’approche énactive de la compréhension de l’esprit. On affirme que, suivant les 
travaux de Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Tom Froese et d’autres, la capacité d’agir 
doit être considérée en termes situationnels plutôt que limités aux individus biologiques. La 
notion de capacité d’agir ainsi revue présente d’importants défis à l’encontre de nos théories et 
nos pratiques actuelles dans ce domaine. En s’appuyant sur les travaux de Harry Heft, Roger 
Barker et d’autres encore, sont avancées quelques ressources théoriques et méthodologiques 
susceptibles d’aider à répondre à ces défis. On affirme que la notion « d’environnement com-
portemental » développée par Roger Barker et ses collègues, plus récemment quelque peu affi-
née par Harry Heft, propose une façon de réfléchir cohérente dans des termes qui abordent la 
nature systémique et holistique de l’activité située.
Mots-clés
capacité	d’agir,	énaction,	environnement	comportemental,	situation,	interaction	sociale,	faire-sens
